When a Shipping Line Is More Than Just a Shipping Line

Vertical Integration (VI) occurs when shipping lines expand beyond their core ocean freight operations to enter other segments of the supply chain, such as port operations, freight forwarding, warehousing, inland transportation, and even last-mile and e-commerce logistics.

Vertical integration in container shipping is not a new concept. However, following the COVID-19 pandemic—when carriers reaped record-high profits from surging freight rates—this trend has exploded on an unprecedented scale. Maersk acquired a series of logistics companies in the U.S. and Asia; CMA CGM made major investments in air freight, acquiring GEFCO, Bolloré Logistics, ASTI, and more. Meanwhile, MSC spent over USD 6 billion to acquire Bolloré Africa Logistics and expanded its reach with companies like Log-in Logistica, Clasquin, and AlisCargo Airlines. Shipping lines are gradually realizing their ambition to become “end-to-end supply chain managers,” no longer merely container movers or port operators.

This shift has led to a critical consequence: shipping lines are now directly competing with their former partners—independent freight forwarders and logistics providers.

For a long time, the international logistics chain functioned through the cooperation of three parties: shipping lines, forwarders, and shippers. However, as carriers begin to offer door-to-door services, acquire stakes in major seaports, own warehouses and delivery fleets, and control digital platforms, the role of traditional forwarders has started to diminish. Smaller forwarders risk being pushed out of the value chain if they do not possess distinct value.

Notably, in many regions, shipping lines are exempt from antitrust laws under “shipping alliances,” which allow them to share information on vessels, routes, and ports at an extensive level—a competitive advantage that independent logistics companies simply cannot access.

In contrast, international shipping lines are steadily expanding their influence. Maersk Vietnam offers end-to-end logistics services, operates warehouses, and handles inland delivery, all while maintaining a strong connection to CMIT port. CMA CGM holds shares in ports such as Gemalink and VICT and has entered the barge transport market through a joint venture with ITC and Gemadept. MSC, via its logistics arm Medlog, is aggressively expanding in Vietnam’s southern key economic region—and may gain an even stronger foothold if its proposed investment in the Can Gio Port project is approved. Other Asian players like SITC, Sinokor, and HMM have also invested in depots and are planning further infrastructure expansion.

In this context, the author argues that without timely recognition and response, Vietnam’s logistics ecosystem—including ports, depots, and warehouses—risks being dominated by multinational corporations. Domestic enterprises may lose their significance, and smaller players could become mere satellites in a larger system.

Since 2018, there have been conferences on controlling economic concentration in logistics, yet the author is unaware of any antitrust investigations in this field in Vietnam to date. In contrast, the European Union, the U.S., China, and South Korea have each conducted investigations into major shipping lines since the pandemic.

Vietnam needs to swiftly develop a cross-sector oversight framework involving coordination among agencies such as the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the General Department of Customs, and the Ministry of Construction. Equally important is the proactive engagement of domestic businesses. If Vietnamese logistics companies fail to unite and build strong industry clusters and large-scale ecosystems, they risk being eliminated from the market as customers grow accustomed to the “one-stop solutions” offered by shipping lines.

Dang Duong – Head of Communications, LCC